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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCHES BY
PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS VALID
ON "REASONABLE GROUNDS"
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has shown a steady willing-
ness to expand the constitutional protections afforded to public
school students. The Court's attitude in favor of students' rights is
demonstrated by cases providing students with the protections
guaranteed by the first,' fifth,2 and fourteenth3 amendments. His-
torically, however, the Court has not adopted this attitude towards
the issue of students' fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. 4 Consequently, state and federal
1 The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the principals of high schools in Des
Moines suspended students who wore black armbands to their schools in protest of hos-
tilities in Vietnam. The Court held that a student retains his first amendment rights
unless his conduct "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or in-
vasion of the rights of others." Id. at 515. The Court emphasized that "[i]t can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the school house gate." Id. at 506.
2 The fifth amendment states that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. See e.g. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1908). In Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy was placed in a correctional institu-
tion for boys pursuant to an adjudication in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The
Court found that the proceeding failed to satisfy the basic requirements of due process
and held that children in juvenile delinquency proceedings are entitled to adequate no-
tice of the charges against them, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to remain silent. Id. at 33, 41, 47, 55. The Court
stressed that the Bill of Rights was not intended to apply only to adults. Id. at 30.
3 The fourteenth amendment states that "No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, Ohio public high school students were
suspended from school without a hearing for up to ten days for misconduct pursuant to
an Ohio statute. The Court held that the high school students were denied due process
of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment because they were suspended without a
hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter. Id. at 582-83.
4 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
1985] SEARCHES BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS 899
courts considering the question of whether students are entitled to
fourth amendment protection have produced divergent and con-
flicting opinions. 5
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 6 the Court for the first time directly ad-
dressed the issue of the fourth amendment's relationship to school
searches. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion in TL.O. will probably
only serve to compound the confusion already existing among state
and federal courts concerning the constitutional validity of searches
conducted by school officials. Instead of applying the traditional
fourth amendment standard of probable cause to assess the validity
of a search of a student's purse conducted by an assistant principal,
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
As the language above suggests, the fourth amendment only prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 322 (1966). The Supreme
Court has incorporated the warrant and probable cause language of the fourth amend-
ment into the reasonableness requirement. See Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 859
(1979). Consequently, the Court has held that a search conducted without a warrant is
"per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few well-deline-
ated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This Note will
closely examine the Court's focus on probable cause in assessing the reasonableness of
searches as well as the few exceptions to the probable cause requirement.
5 An analysis of the case law indicates that there are at least six approaches em-
ployed by courts addressing the issue of the fourth amendment's relationship to public
schools. First, some courts have held that because school officials are exercising paren-
tal authority over children while they are in school, school officials are private individu-
als exempt from the dictates of the fourth amendment when they conduct searches in
the public schools. See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Second, some courts
have held that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches by school officials be-
cause the fourth amendment's requirements apply only to law enforcement personnel.
See D.R.C. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). Third, at least one court has
held that the traditional probable cause standard of the fourth amendment applies to
searches conducted in public schools. See State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated,
423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976). See also State v. Young, 234
Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (GunterJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); State
v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (Rosellini, J., dissenting). Fourth,
other courts have held that the probable cause standard applies in full force when
searches are conducted in public schools with the assistance of police officers. See, e.g.,
Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Il. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216
S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975). Fifth, one court has held that the tradi-
tional probable cause standard applies in public school searches which are highly intru-
sive. See M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979). Finally, a majority of the courts
have held that although the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted in the
public schools, the constitutional validity of these searches should be measured by a
standard less demanding than probable cause. See, e.g., Helliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Doe v. State, 88
N.M. 827, 540 P.2d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
6 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
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the Court announced a new standard derived by balancing the
school official's interest in maintaining an educational environment
against the student's expectations of privacy. 7 Based on a balancing
of these interests, the Court announced that a search of a student by
a teacher is constitutional "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."'8
The Court's balancing test for school searches departs from the
"long-prevailing" view that "probable cause embodied 'the best
compromise that has been found for accomodating [the] often op-
posing interests' in 'safe-guard[ing] citizens from rash and unrea-
sonable interferences with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."' 9
Although the Court has recognized a few exceptions to the require-
ment that fourth amendment searches and seizures must be based
on probable cause, none of these exceptions covers a full-scale
search of a student to discover evidence of a minor school
violation.10
This Note examines the Court's decision to depart from the
traditional probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment
and derive a standard for school searches based on a balancing of
the relevant interests.11 The Note argues that the balancing test
used by the Court carves out an unprecedented exception to the
traditional probable cause standard that will cause confusion among
school administrators, as well as courts, and lead to unjustified
searches of students. 12 The traditional fourth amendment standard
of probable cause, when accompanied by the few isolated excep-
tions where probable cause is not required to make a search, ade-
quately protects both the school official's interest in preserving an
educational environment and the student's expectations of
privacy.'
3
II. FACTS OF T.L.O.
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at the Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N.J., discovered the respondent T.L.O. and an-
7 See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
8 105 S. Ct. at 744.
9 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1978) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 81-38.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 140-60.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 161-83.
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other girl smoking in a lavatory.' 4 T.L.O. was a fourteen-year-old
freshman at that time. 15 Although the possession of cigarettes was
not a violation of school rules, smoking in the lavatory was prohib-
ited.' 6 Consequently, the teacher escorted the two girls to a meet-
ing in the principal's office with the Assistant Vice Principal, Mr.
Theodore Choplick.' 7
At the meeting with Mr. Choplick, T.L.O.'s companion admit-
ted that she had violated the school rule prohibiting smoking in the
lavatory.' 8 T.L.O., however, denied that she had been smoking in
the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all. Mr. Choplick
moved T.L.O. to his private office and demanded to see her purse.
When the school official opened up the purse, he found a pack of
cigarettes. Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling
papers while reaching into the purse for cigarettes. Knowing that
rolling papers are often associated with marijuana use, the school
official continued to search the purse thoroughly. This search re-
vealed a small amount of marijuana, marijuana paraphernelia, a
large sum of money, and two letters indicating that T.L.O. was in-
volved in marijuana dealing. 19 Mr. Choplick turned all of the evi-
dence of the drug dealing over to the police.
T.L.O. and her mother later proceeded to police headquarters
where T.L.O confessed to selling marijuana in the high school. On
the basis of T.L.O.'s confession and the evidence obtained from her
purse, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in ju-
venile court.20 T.L.O. moved to suppress her confession to smoking
in the lavatory contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her purse
violated the fourth amendment. 21 The juvenile court denied the
motion to suppress. In determining whether Mr. Choplick's search
was reasonable, the court applied the standard that a school official
may conduct searches based on a reasonable belief that a crime has
14 105 S. Ct. at 736.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 736-37.
18 Id. at 737.
19 Id. Specifically, Mr. Choplick's search revealed "a small amount of marijuana, a
pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills,
an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two
letters that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing." Id.
20 T.L.O. also received a three-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in
a nonsmoking area and a seven-day suspension for possession of marijuana. Id. at 737
n. 1. On T.L.O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set
aside the seven-day suspension finding that the evidence in T.L.O.'s purse was seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. I&J
21 Id. at 737.
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been committed or that the school environment is being
threatened.2 2 The court concluded that Mr. Choplick had a well-
founded suspicion that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. More-
over, the court stated that the evidence of marijuana in T.L.O.'s
purse entitled Mr. Choplick to conduct a thorough search to deter-
mine the scope of T.L.O.'s drug involvement. The court found
T.L.O. to be a delinquent and later sentenced her to a year's proba-
tion. A divided Appellate Division affirmed the juvenile court's find-
ing that Mr. Choplick had not violated the fourth amendment.
23
The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved the standard used
by the juvenile court to determine whether Mr. Choplick's search
violated the fourth amendment.2 4 The court, however, with two jus-
tices dissenting, reversed the juvenile court's conclusion that, under
the standard, the search of the purse was reasonable.2 5 The court
stated that since possession of cigarettes did not violate school
rules, Mr. Choplick's desire to obtain evidence that would impeach
T.L.O.'s claim that she did not smoke did not justify his search.26
Consequently, the court ordered suppression of the evidence found
in T.L.O.'s purse; the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule pre-
vented the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized
by school officialsY 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
22 The full statement of the standard applied by the juvenile court was as follows:
[A] school may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed,
or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school disci-
pline or enforce school policies.
State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. 329, 341, 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (1980) (emphasis in origi-
nal). This standard would allow a school official to conduct a search based on a reason-
able suspicion without obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a magistrate.
For a discussion of the meaning of probable cause, see infra text accompanying notes
163-67
23 State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 NJ. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982). Nevertheless, the
appellate division vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determi-
nation whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her fifth amendment rights
before confessing. T.L.O. meanwhile appealed the fourth amendment ruling to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. State ex reL T.L.O., 94 NJ. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
24 Id. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-42.
25 Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942.
26 The court alternatively found that Mr. Choplick did not have reasonable grounds
to believe that T.L.O.'s purse contained cigarettes. Id. Moreover, the court maintained
that even if Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the existence of rolling
papers inside the purse did not justify his extensive rummaging through the purse. Id.
at 348, 463 A.2d at 943.
27 Id. at 350, 463 A.2d at 944. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence ob-
tained through an illegal search is not admissible at trial. The rule was formed to pro-
vide an effective recourse for people whose fourth amendment rights had been violated.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule has been re-
garded as an essential component of the fourth amendment since Mapp v. Ohio, 367
902 [Vol. 76
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cide whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for
fourth amendment violations committed by school officials.
28
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court, Justice White writing for the majority, re-
versed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court that the
school official's search of T.L.O.'s purse was unconstitutional. 29 In
deciding that the search was constitutional, the Court first held that
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school offi-
cials.30- The State of New Jersey had contended that the fourth
amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures car-
ried out by law enforcement officers. The Court, however, disposed
of this argument by stating that "the basic purpose of [the fourth]
amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials." 3' The Court also challenged
U.S. 643 (1961), see Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping The Future, 53
VA. L. Rav. 1314, 1325 (1967), however, courts have split over whether the exclusionary
rule is an appropriate remedy for fourth amendment violations committed by school
officials. See, e.g., Young, 234 Ga. at 488, 216 S.E.2d at 586 (exclusionary rule does not
apply to evidence obtained from school searches); Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated,
423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976) (exclusionary rule applies to
exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and delinquency pro-
ceedings). See also Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IowA L. REv. 739, 742 n.20 (1974) ("mhe need for a deterrent to unreasonable
searches by the police is as strong when children are the victims as when adults are, and
the fact that the children are confined in school when the search is conducted would
seem to make the need greater rather than less.").
28 105 S. Ct. at 788. Although certiorari was granted to decide the issue of the ap-
propriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful searches, the Court stated
that the remedy issue should not be decided without considering the limits, if any, the
fourth amendment imposes on school officials and ordered argument on that question.
Id. The Court's opinion ultimately did not address the question whether the exclusion-
ary rule applies to evidence obtained from unlawful searches conducted by school offi-
cials because the Court found Mr. Choplick's search to be lawful. In fact, the Court
noted that "our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the
fourth amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of
the exclusionary rule." Id at 739 n.3. The Court's decision to to consider the appropri-
ate fourth amendment standard, even though certiorari was granted only to determine
the applicability of the exclusionary rule, was influenced by the struggle of state and
federal courts considering the constitutional validity of school searches. See idL at 739
n.2
29 105 S. Ct. at 747. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor joined Justice White.
30 Id at 741.
31 Id. at 740 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). For
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the argument that school officials are exempt from the fourth
amendment because they are exercising parental rather than state
authority.32 This view, the Court found, "is in tension with contem-
porary reality and the teachings of this Court.1
33
After holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches
conducted by school officials, the Court then announced the fourth
amendment standard governing searches in public schools. The
Court held that a school official is justified in conducting a search
"when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence" that a law or school policy has been violated
by a student.34 To arrive at this standard, the Court balanced the
interest of school teachers and administrators in maintaining an ed-
ucational environment against the students' legitimate expectations
of privacy.35 The Court employed a balancing test to determine a
reasonableness standard for searches conducted in public schools
because several Supreme Court cases have recognized the validity of
searches based on standards less demanding than probable cause
when a compelling governmental interest outweighed the intrusive-
ness of the search involved.36 Consequently, the Court stated that
adopting a standard for searches conducted in public schools that is
less demanding than probable cause was justified by the substantial
need of school officials to maintain order in the schools.3 7 The
previous cases upholding the applicability of the fourth amendment to public officials,
see infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
32 105 S. Ct. at 741.
33 This argument was not raised by the State of New Jersey, which conceded that
public school officials are state agents for purposes of the fourth amendment. See id. at
740. However, it was addressed by the Court because several federal and state courts
had held that the special relationship between school officials and students exempts
school officials from the dictates of the fourth amendment. Id. The Court, referring to
the Tinker and Gault decisions stated that "[i]f school authorities are state actors for pur-
poses of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is
difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than
public authority when conducting searches of their students." Id. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 70-80.
34 The full standard stated by the Court was that "(a] search of a student by a teacher
or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." Id. This standard will be
referred to as the "reasonable grounds" standard in this Note. The Court dearly lim-
ited this standard to searches carried out by school authorities acting alone. The appro-
priate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in
conjunction with law enforcement officers was not addressed by the Court. Id- at 744
n.7.
35 See id. at 744.
36 See id. at 743. For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases using a standard less
demanding than probable cause see infra text accompanying notes 81-138.
37 Id. The Court noted that "[m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been
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Court also added that a search satisfying this standard "will be per-
missible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably re-
lated to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."38
The Court applied the "reasonable grounds" standard to the
facts and held that Mr. Choplick's search was reasonable for fourth
amendment purposes.39 The Court stated that Mr. Choplick's
search for cigarettes was reasonable since evidence of cigarettes in
T.L.O.'s purse, although not conclusive of the charge that she had
been smoking in the lavatory, "would both corroborate the report
that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her de-
fense to the charge of smoking."40 The Court then indicated that
the further search for marijuana when the school official saw a pack-
age of rolling papers in T.L.O.'s purse was also reasonable because
the discovery of rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that T.L.O. had marijuana as well as cigarettes in her purse.
41
Thus, the Court held that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
to exclude the evidence from T.L.O.'s juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding on fourth amendment grounds was erroneous.
B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
According to a concurring opinion written by Justice Powell,
with whom Justice O'Connor joined, the Court should have placed
greater emphasis on the special characteristics of elementary and
secondary schools in reaching the conclusion that students are not
entitled to the same constitutional protections granted adults and
juveniles in non-school settings.42 Justice Powell stressed that due
to the compelling interest of teachers in maintaining an educational
atmosphere and the lack of an adversarial relationship between
easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug
use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems." Id. at 742.
38 Id. at 744. The Court included this limitation on the scope of school searches to
satisfy the requirement that searches must be "reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interfence in the first place." See Terry v. Ohio, 592 U.S.
1, 20 (1968).
39 Id. at 746. The Court noted that although the standard applied by the NewJersey
Supreme Court was similar to the "reasonable grounds" standard, the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision to invalidate the search of T.L.O.'s purse "reflects a some-
what crabbed notion of reasonableness." Id. at 745.
40 Id. at 745. The Court cited Fed. Rule Evid. 401 for the proposition that to be
relevant to an issue, evidence need only have "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable for less
probable that it would be without the evidence." Id. at 746.
41 Id. at 747.
42 Id. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring).
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teachers and students, constitutional rules do not apply "with the
same force and effect in the schoolhouse as [they do] in the enforce-
ment of criminal laws." 43 Consequently, Justice Powell maintained
that the Court was justified in adopting a fourth amendment stan-
dard less demanding than the probable cause standard granted to
adults and children in non-school settings.
In addition to the concurring opinion ofJustice Powell, Justice
Blackmun separately concurred in the judgment of the Court. Jus-
tice Blackmum stated that in adopting the "reasonable grounds"
standard, the Court should have stressed that the use of a balancing
test is an exception to the traditional probable cause standard justi-
fied by the substantial need of school officials to maintain order in
the public schools. 44 Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the
standard formulated by the Court, he stated that only when "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" made the war-
rant and probable cause requirement impracticable, was a court en-
titled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers. 45 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concluded that "the spe-
cial need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens
either the safety of school children and teachers or the educational
process" warranted use of the "reasonable grounds" standard de-
rived from a balancing test.4
6
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, with whom Justice
Marshall joined, agreed with the Court's holding that the fourth
amendment applies to searches conducted by public school offi-
cials. 47 The dissent, however, disagreed with the Court's use of a
balancing test instead of the traditional probable cause standard.
The dissent noted that in the Court's past decisions, probable cause
had been a prerequisite for a full-scale search.48 The Court's only
43 Id. Powell took a view shared in numerous cases. For example, in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Court considered a claimed "invasion of [a] minor's
constitutionally protected freedoms." Id. at 638. The Court "recognized that even
where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, 'the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults .... .' Id.
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). But c.f Tinker, 393 U.S. at
511 ("Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution.").
44 105 S. Ct. at 748-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45 Id. at 749 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949) (probable cause affords "the best compromise that has been found
[Vol. 76906
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prior support for a balancing test had been in the narrow context of
minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law enforcement in-
terests.49 Since the search of T.L.O.'s purse was a full-scale search,
the dissent indicated that the constitutional probable cause standard
should have been applied by the Court.50 The dissent stated that
under a probable cause standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision would have been affirmed since the presence of rolling pa-
pers did not give Mr. Choplick probable cause to continue rummag-
ing through T.L.O.'s purse.51
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the
Court should have affirmed the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling
that the exclusionary rule applied to the evidence found in T.L.O.'s
purse without discussing the appropriate fourth amendment stan-
dard in public schools.52 Justice Stevens believed that by announc-
ing the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court needlessly and
inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question: the
only issue presented by the State of New Jersey's petition, Stevens
argued, was whether the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule ap-
plies to searches made by school officials. 53 In finding that the rule
did, Justice Stevens concluded that the application of the exclusion-
ary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches
conveys an important message to students, who attend school to
learn about the values essential to a democratic society, that "our
society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional
rights." 54
Justice Stevens also argued that, even if the issue of the fourth
amendment standard for school searches was before the Court, the
Court misapplied the standard of reasonableness embodied in the
for accomodating the opposing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the citizens
from unreasonable searches.").
49 105 S. Ct. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(police officers may "frisk" suspects who they reasonably believe to be dangerous).
50 Id. The Court should have focused on the warrant and probable cause require-
ments because Mr. Choplick's search "encompassed a detailed and minute examination
of T.L.O.'s purse, in which the contents of private papers and letters were throroughly
scrutinized."
51 Id. The dissent stated that the unconstitutionality of Mr. Choplick's decision to
continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s purse after finding rolling papers made it unnec-
essary to consider whether the initial search by Mr. Choplick was valid. Id.
52 Id. at 759, 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in public schools was the only issue in the case because the State
of NewJersey had properly declined to submit to the Court the purely factual dispute of
whether Mr. Choplick's search violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 761.




fourth amendment. Justice Stevens noted that the "reasonable
grounds" standard adopted by the Court would permit teachers to
search students for evidence when even the most trivial school regu-
lation had been violated.55 To prevent such an infringement on stu-
dents' privacy, Justice Stevens proposed a standard that "would
permit teachers and school administrators to search a student when
they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that
the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disrup-
tive of school order, or the educational process." 56 Based on this standard,
Justice Stevens concluded that the forcible opening of T.L.O.'s
purse was unconstitutional at its inception because a smoking infrac-
tion "was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of school or-
der or the educational process .... -57
IV. ANALYSIS
The T.L. . decision is flawed in several respects. First, although
the Court initially stressed the importance of students' rights to pri-
vacy in holding that the fourth amendment's prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by
school officials, the Court then minimized the fourth amendment
protection afforded to students by using a balancing test to carve
out an unprecedented exception to the probable cause standard for
full-scale searches conducted in public schools.58 Second, even if
the balancing test employed by the Court was warranted by tradi-
tional fourth amendment analysis, the "reasonable grounds" stan-
dard adopted by the Court will promote unjustified searches in
public schools since the privacy rights of students were not given
adequate weight in the Court's balancing of the relevant interests. 59
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY
SCHOOL OFFICIALS
In holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches con-
ducted by school officials, the Court first disposed of the argument
that the fourth amendment was intended to regulate only searches
and seizures conducted by law enforcement officers. 60 Although the
55 Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relaxed standard adopted by the Court "will
permit school administrators to search students suspected of violating only the most
trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.").
56 Id. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
57 Id. at 766-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 See infra text accompanying notes 81-139.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 140-60.
60 105 S. Ct. at 740.
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fourth amendment was originally intended to constrain actions by
law enforcement officers, 6 1 the Court has held that the purpose of
the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by all public officials. In United States v.
Chadwick,6 2 the Court stated:
Silence in the historical record tells us little about the Framer's atti-
tude toward application of the Warrant Clause to the search. What we
do know is that the Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of
that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard funda-
mental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it
birth.6
3
Thus, the fact that the Framers did not intend for the fourth amend-
ment to constrain the actions of school officials does not preclude
the fourth amendment from being a safeguard of the rights of stu-
dents today.
Historically, the only types of searches which the Court has
placed outside of the requirements of the fourth amendment are
those conducted by private individuals with no state connections.64
The "origin and history [of the fourth amendment] show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the actions of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies." ' 65 Consequently, the fourth amendment has been held to
restrict the actions of housing inspectors, 66 OSHA inspectors,67 and
firemen. 68 Furthermore, the requirements of the fourth amendment
apply to state actors because the Supreme Court has ruled that any
fundamental rights protected from federal action by the fourth
61 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth amendment was created by
men who remembered "[t]he practice... in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to
the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places
for smuggled goods" without any check on the actions of the officers).
62 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
63 Id. at 8-9.
64 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). In Burdeau, the Court held
that documents wrongfully obtained by individuals through an unlawful search may be
presented as evidence by the United States in a criminal proceeding as the individuals
obtained the documents without the participation or knowledge of any government offi-
cial. Id.
65 Id. at 475.
66 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 ("[tlhe basic purpose of this Amendment... is to
safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions .. ").
67 See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (OSHA inspectors need war-
rants pursuant to the fourth amendment to conduct searches of commercial premises).
68 See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). The Court in Tyler held that "official
entries to investigate the cause of a fire must adhere to the warrant procedures to the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 508. The Court added that "the Fourth Amendment ex-
tends beyond the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a law enforcement officer
in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime." Id. at 504.
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amendment are also protected from state action under the four-
teenth amendment. 69 Thus, the Court's conclusion in the present
case that school officials in public schools, who are employees of the
state, are subject to the fourth amendment is consistent with the
fourth amendment's purpose of safeguarding the privacy of individ-
uals against unreasonable searches by all public officials, not only
those conducted by law enforcement officers.
In extending the fourth amendment to searches conducted by
school officials, the Court also strongly rejected the reasoning of
some courts "that school officials are exempt from the dictates of
the fourth amendment by virtue of the special nature of their au-
thority over school children." 70 These courts have used the in loco
parentis theory, which proposes that school officials stand in the
place of the students' parents while the students are in school, to
hold that school officials conducting searches are not restricted by
the fourth amendment because they are merely acting in place of the
parents for the purpose of protecting the welfare of students, not as
government agents for the purpose of obtaining a criminal convic-
tion.71 The philosophy underlying the in loco parentis theory is that
since a school official exercises parental authority, he is vested with
the parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities to protect the stu-
dents' health. 72 The in loco parentis theory has been effectively used
by courts to negate the fourth amendment protection of students.7 3
For three reasons, the Court properly rejected the in loco parentis
69 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The fourteenth amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
70 105 S. Ct. at 740-41. The common law doctrine of in locoparentis states:
The parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco parentis, and has such a
portion of power of the parent committed to his charge, viz that of restraint and
correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
12 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453.
71 See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). In the
Donaldson case, the court held that the in loco parentis theory justified a search by school
officials of a student's book locker. Id. at 513, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The school officials,
who searched the student's locker after receiving a tip that the student had been selling
drugs in the school, found marijuana in the locker. The court indicated that the school
official was simply following his obligation "to maintain discipline in the context of a
proper and orderly school operation" and not acting as "a governmental official within
the meaning of the fourth amendment." Id. at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
72 See generally S. DAVIS, RIGrs OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM 1.1
(1980).
73 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 71.
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theory as being "in tension with contemporary reality and the teach-
ing of this Court." 74 First, the Court argued that school officials are
acting "in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disci-
plinary policies." '75 As such, a school official acquires power over
students directly by reason of the school policies or state statutes.
This argument by the Court is consistent with the fact that most
jurisdictions now have laws compelling school attendance and spe-
cifically granting powers and responsibilities to school officials.76 A
school official statutorily charged with maintaining discipline in the
school is clearly exercising state authority regardless of whether the
in loco parentis theory applies to the official's conduct.77
Second, the Court's argument that the in loco parentis theory is
no longer a realistic doctrine is supported by the significant changes
in public schools over the past fifty years. Teachers today usually
have many students in each class and therefore rarely form close
relationships with students on an individual basis. The days of the
small one-room school-house where teacher and students spent the
entire day together are gone. 78 The increasingly impersonal nature
of schools makes the theory that school officials act as students' sur-
rogate parents untenable.
Finally, even in schools which have retained a personal atmos-
phere, the responsibilities of teachers differ from those of parents.
School officials are employed to educate children and to formulate
school curriculum for all the students, not to serve the interest of
individual students.7 9 Moreover, "the literal translation of in loco
parentis means "in the place of the parent" and yet it can hardly be
argued that a parent would search his child, have him arrested, and
turn over the evidence to the police to be used in criminal proceed-
ings."80 School officials do not show the genuine parental protec-
74 105 S. Ct. at 741.
75 Id.
76 Several courts have noted that public school officials are state employees whose
responsibilities are derived from state authority. See State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 860, 871
(Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420,424, 528 P.2d 113, 115 (1974).
77 See People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 486, 315 N.E.2d 466, 468, 358 N.Y.S.2d
403, 406 (1974) (school officials act not as private individuals but "perform as agents of
the state," because public school authority's "special responsibilities" and "correspond-
ingly broad powers" are derived from state law).
78 Note, School Officials May Conduct Student Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness
Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environment, 14 SETON HALL 738, 756 (1984).
79 See Buss, supra note 27, at 768 (in loco parentis theory is erroneous phrase in school
context because courts using in loco parentis theory focus "almost entirely on protection
of the other students and on coercive power over the searched student" instead of "pa-
rental protective concern for the student who is threatened with the school's power.").
80 Case Comment, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 526, 531 (1977). In fact, the fallacy of the
argument that school officials are acting with parental authority is demonstrated by the
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tion and concern underlying the in loco parentis theory. Thus, since
the in loco parentis theory is concerned with the protection of chil-
dren, using the theory to exempt school officials from the fourth
amendment requirements when searching students is untenable.
B. USE OF A BALANCING TEST TO DERIVE A "REASONABLE GROUNDS"
STANDARD
While correctly holding that the fourth amendment applies to
searches conducted by school officials, the Court seriously erred in
minimizing the extent of privacy afforded to students by adopting a
"reasonable grounds" standard for searches conducted in public
schools. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court
stated that "the determination of the standard of reasonableness
governing any specific class of searches requires 'balancing the need
of search against the invasion which the search entails."' 81 The
Court's use of a reasonableness standard derived by a balancing of
the relevant interests, however, is at odds with the "long-prevailing"
probable cause standard for fourth amendment analysis. 82
Probable cause is the fourth amendment standard which the
Court has held in many cases to be the prerequisite for a full-scale
search. In 1977, the Court in Dunaway v. New York, 83 reaffirmed the
standard of probable cause as representing "the accumulated wis-
dom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification
necessary to make the kind of invasion involved in an arrest 'reason-
able' under the fourth amendment... without the need to 'balance'
the interest and circumstances involved in particular searches. '84
Probable cause depends "upon whether, at the moment the arrest
was made ... the facts and circumstances within [the arresting of-
ficers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that
the [suspect] had committed or was commiting an offense."85 A
fact that many of the cases challenging the validity of searches conducted in public
schools are brought by the parents of the students. See, e.g., Belliner v. Lund, 438 F.
Supp. 47, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), (search of entire fifth grade class for stolen money was
found to be invalid under the fourth amendment because school officials were not "par-
ticularized with respect to which students might possess the money.").
81 105 S. Ct. at 741 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 536-37).
82 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("The requirement of prob-
able cause has roots that are deep in our history.").
83 442 U.S. 199 (1979).
84 Id. at 208.
85 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (police officers did not have probable cause
to search person based on unspecified information and knowledge that person had crim-
inal record). A warrant obtained pursuant to the warrant and probable cause provision
in the fourth amendment requires a description of the place to be searched or the things
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search conducted without a warrant based on probable cause is per
se unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the "specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment.8 6 Consequently, unless the policy
reasons behind these isolated exceptions also apply to searches con-
ducted by school officials, the Court should have extended the prob-
able cause standard to students in public schools.
In announcing the "reasonable grounds" standard determined
by balancing the relevant interests, the Court primarily relied on
two previous decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court8 7 and Terry v.
Ohio.8 8 In both of these cases, the Court carved out an exception to
the traditional probable cause standard by using a balancing test to
derive a standard less demanding than probable cause.8 9 The Court
cited these cases for the proposition that searches may be excepted
from the warrant and probable cause requirement when "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the
public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of
to be seized, the time of the proposed execution, and a showing of probable cause. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971).
86 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (seizure of car in drive way was not justified under
the "emergency" or "plain view" exceptions because police had ample opportunity to
obtain a valid warrant and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved). The
circumstances under which the Supreme Court has permitted searches based on less
than probable cause, as summarized by one state court, are as follows:
(1) Where the arresting officer has reasonable cause to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous person, he may "stop and frisk" him for a weapon.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
(2) A warrant for the search of a designated area of houses may issue upon a show-
ing that there are "reasonable administrative or legislative standards for conducting
the inspection with respect to a particular dwelling," for health and safety purposes.
For such administrative searches, the strict requirement of personal knowlege of the
officer is relaxed. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
(3) Warrantless searches at borders for aliens or contraband are held to be reason-
able because of the legitimate interest in self-protection, where there is reasonable
cause to believe that laws are being violated. See,, e.g. Carroll v. United States, 207
U.S. 132 (1925) (dicta).
(4) Where there is reasonable cause to believe that contraband is being carried, an
automobile may be searched without a warrant. The exigent circumstance that the
contraband may be carried away out of the jurisdiction and its contents destroyed
was the rationale for this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
(5) No warrant is necessary where the defendant consents to the search. See, e.g.,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
(6) An object in plain view of the government official can be seized, provided he is
rightfully in the position to have that view. See, e.g., Harris v. United States 390 U.S.
234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
See State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 91 n.2, 558 P.2d at 790 n.2 (1977).
87 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
88 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
89 See infra text accompanying notes 91-139.
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reasonableness that stops short of probable cause." 90 An analysis of
the Camara and Terry decisions, however, reveals that the relaxed
fourth amendment standards adopted in these cases were isolated
exceptions limited to the particular facts involved and do not stand
for the rule that courts may always adopt a reasonableness standard
for searches in different contexts.
In Camara, the Court held that a housing inspector making a
routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's hous-
ing code could not undertake an inspection inside the petitioner's
residence without a warrant. 9' Nevertheless, the Court held that the
standard of probable cause controlling issuance of a warrant could
be lower than that applying in the case of a search for evidence of a
criminal violation.92 The Court indicated that a modified probable
cause standard was necessary in the context of housing inspection
because "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions
be prevented .... ."93 Housing inspectors would not be able to sat-
isfy this public interest if the validity of searches were assessed by
the traditional probable cause standard. Furthermore, the Court
stated that housing inspections are "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime" and "involve a rela-
tively limited intrusion of the urban citizen's privacy."' 94 After tak-
ing these factors into consideration, the Court held that probable
cause would be established "if reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling." 95
In citing Camara for the general proposition that a balancing
test may be used to develop a fourth amendment standard for
school searches, the T.L.O. Court ignored several important aspects
of the Camara decision. First, the Court in Camara held that in the
special case of housing inspections, probable cause, not reasonable-
ness, would be determined through a balancing test weighing the
90 105 S. Ct. at 743. The Court also cited the following cases after Camara and Terry
to support the use of a balancing test to derive a fourth amendment standard less de-
manding than probable cause: Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
91 387 U.S. at 534.
92 Id. at 538-39.
93 See id. at 537.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 538. The Court indicated that instead of lessening the overall protections of
the fourth amendment, the standard adopted "merely gives full recognition to the com-
peting public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic
principle behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government inva-
sions of privacy." Id. at 539.
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governmental interest against the privacy right of the citizen. 9
Although probable cause was measured in a new manner, the
Court's holding in Camara was consistent with the general principle
that all searches and seizures are unreasonable unless based on
probable cause. Thus, the T.L.O. Court's use of a reasonableness
standard is contrary to Camara.
Second, the TL.O. Court employed the Camara balancing test
without determining whether the policy reasons for using such a test
in Camara also apply to a school search situation. The decision in
Camara stressed that although the fourth amendment applies to ad-
ministrative searches, the special factors peculiar to housing inspec-
tions required a relaxed standard of probable cause for search
warrant purposes. 97 In other words, the impersonal nature of an
inspection not aimed at discovery of evidence of a crime, made the
search addressed in Camara a "relatively limited invasion" of pri-
vacy.98 The natural inference from the Camara decision is that when
these special factors are absent, not only must the administrative
search be made under the authority of a warrant, but the issuance of
the warrant is appropriate only under the traditional probable cause
standard, rather than the relaxed standard of Camara.99
Although initially the search of T.L.O.'s purse may seem to be a
purely "administrative search" and thus indistinguishable from the
search conducted in Camara, the facts in the present case do not
show a limited intrusion of the kind associated with the relaxed stan-
dard of probable cause in Camara. To the contrary, the opening of
T.L.O.'s purse was highly personal in nature. The Court itself rec-
ognized that "[a] search of a child's person or of a closed purse or
other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search car-
ried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective
96 387 U.S. at 534-35. See Trosch, Williams & DeVore, Public School Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 11 J.L. & EDuc. 41, 44 (1982) [hereinafter Trosch] ("a magistrate
must weigh all the factors before deciding if probable cause exists, not whether the
search itself is reasonable; without probable cause, the search is unreasonable per se.").
See generally LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries, 74 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1199-1200 (the "difficult question which has troubled several members of the Court in
recent years concerning the extent to which [a] balancing process should supplant the
probable cause requirement .... may be attributable in part to the fact that in the seminal
Camara case the Court was not sufficiently careful in elaborating" when a balancing test
is appropriate).
97 See id at 537. The Court noted that many dangerous housing conditions are not
observable from the outside and cannot be detected by any other canvassing technique
besides inspections. Id.
98 Idj
99 Buss, supra note 27, at 754.
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expectations of privacy."' 00 Thus, the Court incorrectly relied on
Camara because the relaxed standard of probable cause derived
from a balancing test in Camara does not apply to a search as intru-
sive as Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse.
The Court's reliance on Terry for its use of a balancing test to
derive a fourth amendment standard for school searches is also in-
correct. In Terry, a police officer seized a revolver by patting down
the petitioner who, together with two other persons, had several
times returned to stare in a store window for a few minutes.' 0 ' The
Court recognized the narrow authority of a police officer to conduct
a reasonable search for weapons when "he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regard-
less of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime."' 1 2 The Court stated that a police officer is justified in mak-
ing a "frisk" for weapons if "a reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances would be warranted in his belief that, his safety or that
of others was in danger."' 1 3 To arrive at this standard, the Court
balanced the limited violation of the individual's privacy against the
opposing interests of crime prevention and the police officer's
safety.' 04 The Court concluded that a "frisk" amounts " 'to a mere
minor inconvenience and petty indignity,' which can properly be im-
posed upon the citizens in the interest of effective law enforcement
on the basis of police officer's suspicion."' 0 5 The Court warned,
however, that the search must be "reasonably related in scope to the
justification for its initiation."'
' 0 6
Since the Terry decision, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have allowed limited intrusions of an individual's personal security
based on less than probable cause by border guards 10 7 and military
1O0 105 S. Ct. at 741-42.
10 392 U.S. at 7.
102 Id. at 27. This statement by the Court represents the first departure from the
traditional probable cause standard. The Court in Teny stated that, instead of assessing
the validity of the search under the probable cause standard, "the conduct involved in
this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general prescription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." Id. at 20.
103 Id. at 27.
104 Id. at 21-27.
105 Id. at 26 (quoting People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (1964), cert. den'd, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)).
106 Id. at 29. The Court stated that the search "must be limited to that which is neces-
sary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby, and may accurately be characterized as something less than a 'full search.'" Id
at 26.
107 See United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Brigoni-Ponce applied
Terry in the special context of roving border patrols stopping automobiles to check for
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authorities. 10  In each of these cases, the lowering of the fourth
amendment standard barrier was partly "justified by the peculiar se-
curity needs of the activity involved and.., by circumstances weak-
ening the searched person's claim that a protectable interest in
privacy has been seriously ignored." 109 In these cases the relaxation
of the probable cause requirement was also limited to the unique
setting in which the particular searches were conducted. For in-
stance, in United States v. Brigoni-Ponce,"10 the Court indicated that a
less demanding standard than probable cause for border searches
was necessary because "[t]he Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles
long, and even a vastly reinforced Border Patrol would find it im-
possible to prevent illegal border crossings.""'
The Tery line of cases demonstrate that some seizures covered
by the fourth amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the
personal security of those detained and are justified by such sub-
stantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less
than probable cause." 2 The common denominator of the Terry line
illegal immigrants. The investigative stops usually lasted less than one minute and in-
volved "a brief question or two." Id at 880. The Court stated that:
[B]ecause of the importance of the governmental interests at stake, the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the
border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect
that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may
stop the car briifly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.
Id at 881. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random checks for drivers'
licenses and proper vehicle registration not permitted on less than articulable reason-
able suspicion); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (fixed checkpoint
to stop and check vehicles for aliens).
108 See United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964). In Grisby, the court
indicated that the fourth amendment is applied under a military law or in a military
context in a unique and qualified fashion. See id at 654-55. The court held that the
seizure of property from the home of a military officer on the basis of a report that the
officer had stolen government property was constitutionally valid. Id According to the
court, there was "no basis for holding that a search conducted by military authority,
which was completely lawful and valid when made as a matter of military law, is unrea-
sonable under the Constitution." Id. at 656. Consequently, the court held that the com-
manding officer who authorized the search performed the role of a magistrate in the
civilian context. Id.
109 Buss, supra note 27, at 749. After analyzing the searches conducted at a border or
under military authority, Buss concluded that neither of these special settings "provide a
persuasive analogy for erosion of fourth amendment protection in the school setting."
Ide at 753.
110 422 U.S. 873.
111 Id. at 879. Similarly, in Grisby, the court stressed that the fourth amendment must
be applied differently in the military context where "the exercise of military disciplinary
authority, including the conduct of searches, could not be made dependent upon the
issuance of valid civilian process if effective military controls are not to be gravely im-
paired." 335 F.2d at 655.
112 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S 692, 699 (1980) (warrant to search house for con-
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of cases is the limited nature of the search accompanied by some
compelling governmental interest such as protecting police of-
ficers 13 or preventing the illegal entry of aliens. 114 The narrow
scope of these cases is demonstrated by the Court's limit of the
scope of the searches to a frisk for weapons' 15 or a brief series of
questions. 116 Searches which exceed the limited intrusions of pri-
vacy allowed in these cases cannot be conducted without probable
cause. Thus, the Terry line of cases does not represent, as the Court
in T.L. 0. apparently believed, that all types of searches may be gov-
erned by a standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause. 
1 17
The Court's reliance on the Terry line of cases is faulty because
the search conducted by Mr. Choplick of T.L.O.'s purse was intru-
sive and not justified by a compelling governmental interest. First,
the Court's reasoning that the exceptions to the probable cause re-
quirement announced in the Terry line of cases apply to school
searches as intrusive as Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse
"threaten[s] to swallow the general rule that fourth amendment
seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." 118 Un-
like the Terry line of cases, the search of T.L.O.'s purse was highly
personal in nature. A purse usually contains personal items and "it
could prove extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to
traband implicitly includes limited authority to detain occupants of house while search is
being conducted).
113 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-24. The Court stressed the "immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is
not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Id.
at 23.
114 See Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79. The Court stated that "aliens create signifi-
cant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for
jobs, and generating extra demand for social services." Furthermore, the Court noted
that the "aliens themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain
of substandard working conditions without risking deportation." Id.
115 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
116 See Brigoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 211.
117 Nevertheless, as Justice Blackmun indicated in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2652 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring), there "ap-
pears. . . to be an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry
decision into a general statement that the fourth amendment requires only that any
seizure be reasonable." For instance, in his opinion for the Court in Terry, ChiefJustice
Warren identified "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" as "the reasona-
bleness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's per-
sonal security." 392 U.S. at 19. Moreover, Justice White, concurring in Dunaway, noted
that Terry is not "an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable
cause." Instead, Justice White said that "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness-the balancing of competing interests." 442 U.S. at 219 (White, J.,
dissenting).
118 See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213.
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rummage through its contents, which could include notes from
friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities,
and items of personal hygiene."1 19 Furthermore, students such as
T.L.O. do not lose their expectations of privacy upon entering a
public school. Students, unlike soldiers subjected to military disci-
pline or persons attempting to enter the country, do not voluntarily
surrender their expectations of privacy. Even the Court recognized
that students need to bring personal items to school and do not
''waive all rights to property in such items merely by bringing them
onto school grounds." 120 Thus, the Court incorrectly relied on the
Teny line of cases because the exceptions from the warrant and
probable cause requirements announced in these cases do not apply
to searches as intrusive as Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse.
In addition to ignoring the intrusive nature of the search in-
volved, the Court also failed to adequately explain the compelling
governmental interest that justified deriving a standard less de-
manding than probable cause for searches by school officials. The
Court's only justification for departing from the traditional probable
cause standard was "the substantial need of teachers and adminis-
trators for freedom to maintain order in the schools .... 121
Although maintaining an educational environment is a very im-
portant interest for school officials, it does not justify the relaxation
of the probable cause standard. There is certainly a difference be-
tween the difficulty in achieving the overriding security and safety
needs in border searches or police investigations of dangerous
criminals and satisfying the law enforcement interests that have
prompted student searches in public schools. 22 Unlike school offi-
cials, border guards and police officers investigating dangerous
criminals need a fourth amendment standard less demanding than
probable cause to accomplish their interests. There is no way a bor-
der guard could obtain evidence of whether a person was attempt-
ing to bring drugs or dangerous weapons into the country if he
needed probable cause to stop and briefly question persons crossing
the border. Similarly, a police officer would be placed in serious
danger if he needed probable cause to "frisk" a dangerous criminal.
A school official, however, can achieve his interest of maintaining
order in the school through daily supervision of students to deter-
mine with probable cause whether a student has violated a school
policy or committed a crime. In fact, "[s]chool officials often are in
119 105 S. Ct. at 751 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 742.
121 Id. at 743.
122 See Buss, supra note 27, at 752.
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a better position than law enforcement officers to identify, interpret
and record the totality of circumstances necessary to establish prob-
able cause" because school officials "can observe and supervise stu-
dents" on a continuing basis. 123 Thus, the Court's use of a
balancing test is unprecedented because searches conducted in pub-
lic school do not demonstrate the special law enforcement needs
which justify a fourth amendment standard less demanding than
probable cause.
Furthermore, the genuineness of the Court's belief that the
maintenance of an educational environment justifies a less demand-
ing standard is questionable, considering the Court has limited the
application of the "reasonable grounds" standard to searches car-
ried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own author-
ity. 124 By not extending the standard's application to searches
conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies, the Court is perpetuating a dual stan-
dard. Most state and federal courts have held that police participa-
tion in a school search will mandate the full constitutional safeguard
of a warrant issued on probable cause. 125 If the maintenance of an
educational atmosphere in public schools is a sufficient governmen-
tal interest to justify an exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirement, any person who furthers the maintenance of that envi-
ronment should be held to the same relaxed standard. Thus, the
dual fourth amendment standard for school administrators and po-
lice officers, which results from the Court's limitation of the "rea-
sonable grounds" standard to searches conducted by school officials
acting alone, undermines the Court's justification that a "reasonable
grounds" standard is necessary to maintain order in public schools.
In addition to being an unprecedented departure from the
traditional probable cause standard, the Court's adoption of the
"reasonable grounds" standard is inconsistent with the trend to-
wards providing students full constitutional protection. The impor-
tance of providing students with the same constitutional protections
as other persons was first articulated by the Court in Kent v. United
States 126 "There is evidence.., that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
123 Trosch, supra note 96, at 55.
124 105 S. Ct. at 749 n.7. "This case does not present the question of the appropriate
standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunc-
tion with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on
that question." I&.
125 See, e.g., Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding probable
cause standard applicable to searches involving police).
126 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."' 127 The trend of the Court since the decision in Kent has
been towards establishing constitutional protections for students.
In 1969, the Court stated in Tinker that "students [do not] shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or of expression at the
school-house gate."'128 The Court's decision in Tinker emphasized
that the coercive setting of public schools made preserving the stu-
dent's freedom of expression an important means of counterbalanc-
ing that coercion.129 In 1975, the Court in Gault held that students
were entitled to due process when charged with a violation of school
rules. 130 The Tinker and Gault decisions indicate that "the ap-
propriatness and importance of [constitutional protections] seems
particularly called for by the fact that children are compelled by law
to attend school through a substantial portion of their public lives,
and are specially pressured by economic and social constraints to
remain in school even after that."''
1
By adopting a fourth amendment standard less demanding than
probable cause for searches conducted in public schools, the Court
ignored its previous statements about the importance of safeguard-
ing student's constitutional protections in the public schools. The
Court's decisions in Tinker and Gault would seem to indicate that
"the constraints on a student's liberty that result from compulsory
attendance and institutional regulation would evoke a deep judicial
concern for the student's rights to privacy as protected by the fourth
amendment."' 132 The T.L.O. Court, however, did not demonstrate
that judicial concern. Instead, the Court adopted a standard that
provides students with less protection than adults or other children
who are not in public schools.
The Court's justification for adopting the "reasonable
grounds" standard was the important need to preserve order in the
public schools.' 3 3 The Court's reliance on the need to maintain or-
der in schools is nothing more than a return to the in loco parentis
concept. Although the Court indicated that the in loco parentis theory
did not exempt school officials from the fourth amendment require-
ments, the Court stated that school officials act as public officials as
127 Id. at 556.
128 393 U.S. at 506. See supra note 1 for facts of the Tinker decision.
129 Id. at 511. "[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students." Id.
130 387 U.S. at 33.
131 Buss, supra note 27, at 743.
132 Id.
133 105 S. Ct. at 743.
1985]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
well as surrogates for the parents.' 3 4 The Court therefore seems
to be saying that while the in loco parentis theory does not make the
fourth amendment inapplicable to school searches, the relationship
between school officials and students may be considered in applying
the "reasonable grounds" standard.135
The implicit inclusion of the in loco parentis theory in the "rea-
sonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court seriously mini-
mizes the fourth amendment protection afforded to students in
public schools. Courts applying a reasonableness standard influ-
enced by the in loco parentis theory have consistently upheld searches
conducted by school officials.' 3 6 For example, in In re Donaldson,13 7
the court stated that the in loco parentis power gave the school offi-
cials authority "to use moderate force to obtain obedience, includ-
ing the force needed to search lockers."' 138 Moreover, courts
adhering to the in loco parentis theory to apply a reasonableness stan-
dard very seldom discuss how the rights of students are pro-
tected. 13 9 Thus, the Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds"
standard seriously reduces students' fourth amendment protection
and is an extreme departure from the Court's past willingness to
protect the constitutional rights of students.
C. IMPACT OF THE "REASONABLE GROUNDS" STANDARD ON COURTS,
SCHOOL OFFICIALS, AND STUDENTS
Even if the adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard
were not an unprecedented departure from the probable cause stan-
dard, the practical justifications for adopting the standard are not
persuasive. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the
Court stated that "the standard will spare teachers and school ad-
ministrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of
probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according
134 Id. at 741.
135 Several courts have adopted this restrained use of the in loco parentis theory. For
example, one court indicated that the in loco parentis relationship between school officials
and students was critical in applying the standard of reasonableness, but not that this
relationship made the fourth amendment inapplicable. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d
909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731(Sup. Ct. 1971), aft'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
136 See, e.g., In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino,
282 A.2d at 871; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). See also Note,
Search and Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs? 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 119, 127 (1979).
137 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
138 Id. at 513, 223.
139 See Buss, supra note 27, at 772.
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to the dictates of reason and common sense."' 140
Contrary to the Court's belief, the use of the "reasonable
grounds" standard to assess the validity of searches conducted in
public schools will actually cause confusion for both school officials
and the courts. Unlike the probable cause standard, which has many
court decisions and legal authorities defining its meaning,' 4 ' there
is little authority available defining a "reasonable grounds" stan-
dard. 142 Furthermore, the authority that is available concerning the
"reasonable grounds" standard reveals that the standard has been
applied differently from one court to another.
The phrase "reasonable suspicion," another term used by
courts to describe a standard less demanding than probable cause,
was first announced by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in
Terry. Justice Douglas used it to describe the majority's standard for
assessing the constitutional validity of "frisks" of dangerous
criminals made by police officers.' 43 Since its inception in Terry,
many courts faced with the issue of searches conducted in public
schools have adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard as a middle
ground between granting students full warrant and probable cause
protection and completely denying them fourth amendment protec-
tion. Although the courts have used similar terminology to describe
this relaxed standard, the application of the standard to searches
conducted in public schools has been far from uniform. Courts
have indicated that the level of suspicion required to satisfy the
"reasonable suspicion" standard ranges from a "furtive gesture"' 44
to the need to show particular suspicion.
145
140 105 S. Ct. at 744.
141 See id at 756 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("A school system conscientiously attempt-
ing to obey the Fourth Amendment dictates under a probable-cause standard could,
for example, consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet ex-
pounding the rough outlines of the concept.").
142 See id. at 756-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[s]chool system faced with interpret-
ing what is permitted under the Court's new 'reasonableness' standard could be hope-
lessly adrift as to when search may be permissible.").
143 See, e.g., 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144 See, e.g., State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 593, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
The Court in Young even stated that it desired to permit searches "without hinderance or
delay, subject only to the most minimal restraints ... " Id.
145 See, e.g., Helliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. N.Y. 1977) The court in Helliner
stated:
It is entirely possible that there was reasonable suspicion, and even probable cause,
based upon the facts, to believe that someone in the classroom had possession of the
stolen money. There were no facts, however, which allowed the official particularize
with respect to which students migfit possess the money, something which has time
and again found to be necessary to a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).
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Many of the courts employing a "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard have relied on the in loco parentis theory to justify a less rigorous
standard than probable cause. 146 In determining whether "reason-
able suspicion" exists, these courts have stated that "[t]he student's
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must be bal-
anced with the necessity for the school officials ... to fulfill their
duties under the in loco parentis doctrine to protect the health and
welfare of their students."'147 Based on this balancing test, courts
have frequently held that the core of privacy normally protected by
the fourth amendment can be invaded by a school official acting in
loco parentis. 1
48
The opinions of courts using a "reasonable suspicion" standard
influenced by the in loco parentis theory, however, shed very little
light on the meaning of "reasonable suspicion." Many courts sim-
ply emphasize the importance of the in loco parentis role of school
officials without seriously considering other relevant factors which
might argue for or against permitting a search. 149 Although pre-
sumably the facts in these opinions provide a clue to what level of
suspicion is necessary to satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" stan-
146 See, e.g. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 319, N.Y.S.2d at 736; State v. Baccino, 282
A.2d at 872.
147 See, M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Comm. Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
148 See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F.
Supp. 725 (N.D. Ala. 1968). In Moore, the Court held that college administrators needed
only "reasonable cause to believe," rather than the higher constitutional standard of
probable cause, to justify a warrantless search of a student's dormitory room. The court
stated that the less demanding standard was justified "because of the special necessities
of the student-college relationship and because college disciplinary proceedings are not
criminal proceedings in the constitutional sense." Id. at 730. For a case which pushes
the in locoparentis theory to an extreme, see Doe v. Henfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Tex.
1979). In Doe, the court found that entry by school officials into classrooms with drug-
detecting canines was justified under a reasonable suspicion standard influenced by the
in loco parentis theory. The court indicated that although there was no specific informa-
tion about the location of drugs, the search was reasonable because school officials were
permitted to conduct wholesale searches and the dogs were simply used as aides to the
school officials in their in loco parentis duty. Id. at 1022. The court further found that
attention by the dogs to a particular student provided school officials with reasonable
cause to justify a search of the student's pocket. Id. at 1024. The dog's attention to a
particular student, however, did not "provide the necessary reasonable cause to believe
the student actually possesse[d] the drug" to conduct a nude search. Id.
149 See Knowles, Crime Investigation in the School. Its Constitutional Dimensions, 4J. FAM. L.
151 (1964). Professor Knowles stated that:
[T]he phrase in loco parentis expresses nothing save that the school has certain
rights and duties to children in its care. When a court rules that a certain act by a
school official is performed in loco parentis the court is usually concluding that the
act was permissible .... Most simply, the phrase in loco parentis is no guide to
action, but solely a conclusionary label attached to permissible school controls.
Id. at 152 n.1.
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dard, none of the opinions seriously analyze the facts to show why
they satisfy the standard. 50 For instance in State v. Baccino,'5 ' the
Court simply indicated that in light of the school official's in loco
parentis duty to maintain order in the school, a vice principal had a
reasonable suspicion that a student possessed drugs in his jacket.
Other courts list factors such as the student's age, the nature of the
alleged infraction, and the exigency to make the search without de-
lay, finally failing to adequately explain how these factors relate to
"reasonable suspicion."' 152 Thus, the case law concerning the "rea-
sonable suspicion" standard fails to provide meaningful guidance to
school officials in deciding whether a search is constitutional.
The T.L.O. Court, like the many state and federal courts which
had previously used a reasonableness standard for searches in pub-
lic schools, did not adequately explain what "reasonable grounds"
means. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court
simply stated that "[w]e join the majority of courts that have ex-
amined this issue in concluding that.., the legality of a search of a
student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search."' 5 The Court then recited the facts of
Mr. Choplick's search and concluded "that the search was in no
sense unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes."' 54 Although
the Court explained that "reasonable grounds" only requires suffi-
cient probability, 55 the Court's analysis of the facts fails to give a
clear meaning to the standard. In fact, the uncertain meaning of the
"reasonable grounds" standard is demonstrated by the Court's ad-
mission that although the standard applied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court was substantially the same as the standard adopted
by the Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court's application of the
standard to invalidate the search of T.L.O.'s purse reflected a
"somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness."' 156 The opposite re-
150 Buss, supra note 27, at 772.
151 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971). in finding that the principal had a reasonable
suspicion, the court noted that the student was discovered out of class illegally and was
also known to the vice principal to have experienced with drugs in the past. The court,
however, never indicated why these facts satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" standard.
152 See, e.g., Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827 (1979); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315
N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d
781 (1977).
153 105 S.Ct. at 743.
154 Id. at 745.
155 The Court stated that "the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a require-
ment of absolute certainty: 'probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment .. ' Id. at 746 (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797, 804 (1971)).
156 See 105 S. Ct. at 745.
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sults achieved by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court, who both used a similar reasonableness stan-
dard to assess the constitutional validity of the search of T.L.O.'s
purse, indicates that the "reasonable grounds" standard does not
provide courts or school officials with adequate guidance.
According to Justice Brennan in his dissent, "the amorphous
'reasonableness under all the circumstances' standard freshly coined
by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater
uncertainty among teachers and administrators." 157 The probable
impact of the uncertainty concerning the meaning of "reasonable
grounds" is that school officials will be permitted to make unjusti-
fied searches in public schools. Courts applying a reasonableness
standard to school searches rarely discuss how the standard is con-
trolled to protect the student's privacy interest. 158 For instance, the
T.L.O. Court simply concluded that the "reasonable grounds" stan-
dard will not "authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
school children" without seriously considering the harmful effect of
unjustified invasions of students' privacy.' 59 Furthermore, under
the "reasonable grounds" standard, the public school student is
given very little fourth amendment protection, as the decisions of
school officials to conduct searches under similar reasonableness
standards have been upheld with extreme regularity. 160 Courts bal-
ancing a school official's interest in maintaining order against a stu-
dent's legitimate expectations of privacy have almost always found
that reasonable grounds for conducting a search exist. Thus, the
"reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court fails to give
serious consideration to the privacy interests of students and will
probably result in unjustified searches by school officials.
D. ADEQUACY OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL CONTEXT
The "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court is a
departure from the probable cause standard traditionally used to as-
sess the constitutional validity of searches. In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Brennan argued that by adopting the "reasonable
157 Id. at 756 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158 See Buss, supra note 27, at 772. According to Buss, "[t]he failure to discuss in
detail how the standard of 'reasonable suspicion' is controlled to protect the student's
privacy interests seems to reflect a more general failure to seriously consider the interest
of the student who is charged with wrong doing, or the interest in privacy that he cham-
pions in his own self-interest." Id.
159 See 105 S. Ct. at 744.
160 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 135.
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grounds" standard, "the Court carve[d] out a broad exception to
standards that this Court has developed over years of considering
Fourth Amendment problems."' 61 To justify the "reasonable
grounds" standard, the Court indicated that the "reasonable
grounds" standard, as opposed to the traditional probable cause
standard, is required because it is easier for school officials to un-
derstand and provides them with additional flexibility to preserve
order in the public schools.' 62 Neither of these arguments are per-
suasive because the traditional fourth amendment probable cause
standard, together with the isolated exceptions where probable
cause is not required, adequately provide school officials with an ef-
fective and understandable means of maintaining order in public
schools.
The Court's first argument that the "reasonable grounds" stan-
dard was necessary because it is an easier standard for school offi-
cials to apply than the probable cause standard is inconsistent with
previous statements made by the Court concerning the applicability
of the probable cause standard. The Court first announced in Carroll
v. United States 163 that law authorities have probable cause where
"the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
a criminal offense has occured."'6 In Brinegar v. United States,' 65
the Court indicated that "the rule of probable cause is a practical,
non-technical conception" that depends upon "the factual and prac-
tical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians act."' 66  More recently, the Court ex-
plained that probable cause is a "common-sense" test that depends
on an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances" and is "prac-
tical," "fluid," "flexible," "easily applied," and "non-technical."' 6
7
These statements by the Court reveal that although school officials
are not "legal technicians," they are capable of applying the tradi-
tional probable cause standard to determine whether a search of a
student is valid under the fourth amendment.
The need to provide school officials with more flexibility to
maintain order in the public schools than is provided by the tradi-
161 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id at 743-44.
168 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
164 Id at 162.
165 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
166 d at 175-7.
167 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 236, 239 (1983).
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tional probable cause standard is also an improper justification for
the Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard. The
traditional probable cause standard already provides school officials
with the ability to maintain an educational atmosphere in public
schools. School officials who suspect that a student has been violat-
ing a school policy or committing a crime can usually observe the
student while he is in school to determine whether "the totality of
circumstances" provide probable cause to confirm their
suspicions.
168
Furthermore, although school searches will rarely fall within
one of the recognized exceptions to probable cause,' 69 these excep-
tions provide school officials with a means of taking immediate ac-
tion in certain situations where the school environment is
threatened. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun indicated
that "because drug use and possession of weapons have become in-
creasingly common among young people, an immediate response
frequently is required not just to maintain an environment condu-
cive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school
personnel." 170 Justice Blackmun then stated that the "reasonable
grounds" standard is necessary because "[s]uch immediate action
would not be possible if a teacher were required to serve a warrant
before searching a student."' 17 Justice Blackmun's reasoning ig-
nores that exceptions to the probable cause standard exist that
could be applied in a school setting when immediate action is
necessary.
One exception that could be used to justify school searches in
situations where immediate action is required is the "plain view"
doctrine. The "plain view" doctrine provides that "objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evi-
dence."' 72 Under the "plain veiw" doctrine, a school official who
observes a student holding items such as drugs or dangerous weap-
ons may seize these items without obtaining a warrant.1 73 The
168 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
169 See Buss, supra note 27, at 799. Most school search cases could not have applied
any exception to the probable cause standard because the facts indicate that a warrant
could have been obtained or an invalid warrant was obtained.
170 105 S. Ct. at 749-50 (BlackmunJ., concurring).
171 Id. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
173 To date, very few cases have employed the "plain view" doctrine in the school
context. The limited application of the doctrine to school searches is probably due to
the fact that many courts simply require reasonable suspicion to conduct a search and
therefore do not need to cite an exception to the warrant and probable cause require-
ment to constitutionally approve a search. One school search case that did use the
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"plain view" exception may be especially helpful in a school setting
where school officials can constantly supervise and observe
students.
The "emergency" situation is another exception which pro-
vides school officials with the ability to conduct a search without a
warrant. The "emergency" exception applies when there is prob-
able cause to search coupled with the danger that evidence will be
lost if the search is postponed,1 74 or when a situation exists where
the object of the search is so inherently dangerous that a search
must be conducted immediately to prevent injury. 175 School offi-
cials may employ the "emergency" exception to search a student
who they believe possesses a gun or other dangerous weapon when
the search must be conducted immediately to avoid injury. 176 More-
over, school officials who have probable cause to believe that a stu-
dent possesses drugs may conduct a warrantless search if they
sincerely believe that the evidence will be destroyed. 177 Conse-
quently, probable cause is a proper standard for searches in public
schools because in those circumstances where a school official needs
additional flexibility to maintain order, the "plain view" and "emer-
gency" exceptions to the probable cause standard allow school offi-
cials to conduct searches without a warrant. 1
78
"plain view" doctrine was Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970),
afd, 440 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1971). In Speake the court held that the seizure of evidence
which was visible through the windows of a student's vehicle was justified under the
"plain view" doctrine. Id. at 1269.
174 See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 596, 605 (1973). "[W]here there are exigent
circumstances in which police action literally must be 'now or never' to preserve the
evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial
evaluation.").
175 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973) (due to the increased
number of hijackings, a search without a warrant of an individual with "a visible bulge in
[his] right front trouser pocket," which a United States marshal believed was a gun, was
reasonable under the fourth amendment); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963)
(search of individual without warrant was constitutionally valid when the individual's
"furtive conduct in eluding [the police] shortly before the arrest was ground for the
belief that he might well have been expecting the police.").
176 In one case, Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the
court stated that the "rampant crime and drug abuse" in public schools are so severe
that a state of emergency exists justifying a less demanding fourth amendment standard.
In addition to being inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding that exigent circum-
stances must be evaluated in each set of facts, see Terry, 92 U.S. at 21, the court's state-
ment in Nelson demonstrates the danger that the exceptions to the probable cause
requirement may be used by courts to minimize the protection of students. Neverthe-
less, since these exceptions were carefully drawn and "well-delineated," courts and
school officials cannot simply cite an exception as justification for a warrantless search.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
177 See Roaden, 413 U.S. 496.
178 In the instant case, it is clear that Mr. Choplick's search would not have beenjusti-
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Finally, in addition to providing school officials with an ade-
quate means of maintaining an educational environment, the prob-
able cause standard, unlike the "reasonable grounds" standard
adopted by the Court, also sufficiently protects the privacy interests
of the students. The main reason the few exceptions to the warrant
requirement have been "jealously and carefully drawn" is that ad-
herence to the probable cause standard is necessary to protect per-
sons from unreasonable invasions of their privacy. 179 In Katz v.
United States,' 80 the Court said that "[w]herever a man be, he is enti-
tled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches
and seizures."' 181 Moreover, the Court stated in Shelton v. Tucker' 8
2
that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no-
where more vital than in the community of American schools"
where students are being educated for citizenship. 183 These state-
ments by the Court indicate that, due to the importance of schools
in teaching students about democratic principles, students should
be provided with full constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures by school officials.
The traditional probable cause standard, unlike the "reason-
able grounds" standard which affords less constitutional protection
to students than adults or other children, adequately protects stu-
dents' right to privacy. Applying the probable cause standard to
searches conducted in public schools would demonstrate to stu-
dents the importance of the fourth amendment's protections to all
persons in our democratic society. Thus, instead of adopting the
"reasonable grounds" standard, the Court should have applied the
traditional probable cause standard for searches conducted by
school officials because the probable cause standard would provide
school officials with a means of maintaining an educational environ-
ment while also protecting the privacy interests of students.
fled by either the "plain view" or "emergency" exceptions. First, the "plain view" doc-
trine did not justify the search for marijuana in T.L.O.'s purse because Mr. Choplick
only saw rolling papers, not marijuana, while looking for cigarettes in T.L.O.'s purse.
Second, the "emergency" exception did not apply to the search of T.L.O.'s purse be-
cause Mr. Choplick did not have probable cause to believe that T.L.O. possessed mari-
juana that she was going to destroy. Moreover, the presence of marijuana in T.L.O.'s
purse did not pose the serious danger to students and teachers that would have allowed
Mr. Choplick to search the purse for "emergency" reasons.
179 See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214 (Court's "reluctance to depart from the proved pro-
tections afforded by [probable cause]" is demonstrated by "the narrow limitations em-
phasized in the cases" adopting a standard less demanding than probable cause).
180 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181 Id. at 359.
182 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
183 Id. at 487.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard for
assessing the validity of searches conducted in public schools was
unprecedented and unnecessary. Probable cause has long been ac-
cepted as the traditional fourth amendment standard, and searches
conducted without probable cause are per se unreasonable unless
they fall within one of the "specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions" to the warrant and probable cause requirement.
184
Although maintaining order in public schools is an important goal,
it does not justify carving out an exception to the probable cause
requirement for full-scale searches which seriously intrude upon the
privacy interests of students. The need of school officials to main-
tain order in public schools is adequately protected by the tradi-
tional fourth amendment probable cause standard. The Court's
adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard was therefore an
unwarranted intrusion upon the fourth amendment protection of
students.
Despite the Court's adoption of a relaxed fourth amendment
standard in T.L.O., students may not necessarily be subjected to un-
necessary intrusions of privacy. Although the fourth amendment is
the primary means used to assess the validity of searches conducted
by school officials, there are other constitutional and statutory
grounds for challenging the validity of a search. First, states which
have constitutional provisions corresponding to the fourth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution may insist on a more demanding
standard than "reasonable grounds."' 185 The "reasonable grounds"
standard only represents the minimum amount of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures that must be provided to stu-
184 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
185 See 105 S. Ct. at 745 n.10. This greater protection is possible since a federal court
will not review judgments of state courts resting on adequate and independent grounds.
See Herb v. Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). For example, in State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317
(La.), vacated sub nom., Louisiana v. Mora, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), modified, 330 So. 2d 900
(La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the con-
stitutional validity of searches conducted in public schools should be evaluated by the
warrant and probable cause standard. Id, at 520. The United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded for a determina-
tion whether the judgment was based on federal or state constitutional grounds. The
Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that it relied on both the federal and state constitu-
tions, 423 U.S. at 941. The writ of certiorari by the State of Louisiana was consequently
denied by the Supreme Court. If the Louisiana Supreme Court had indicated that its
holding was based soleley on federal constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court would
have had an opportunity to develop a fourth amendment standard for school searches
nearly ten years prior to the Court's decision in T.L.O..
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dents in public schools. 186 Second, state legislation may be enacted
that requires the exclusion of evidence obtained through school
searches conducted without probable cause. For example, one state
is presently considering legislation which provides that no contra-
band seized pursuant to a search without probable cause shall be
admissible in any adjudication brought under the juvenile court. 187
Thus, although the "reasonable grounds" standard adopted in
T.L.O. will minimize the fourth amendment protection available to
students, alternative means may exist to provide students with ade-
quate protection against unreasonable intrusions of privacy.
NEAL I. AIZENSTEIN
186 See 105 S. Ct. at 745 n. 10. (State courts may insist on a more demanding standard
under their own constitutions because they "would not purport to be applying the
Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a search.").
187 See H.R. 0380, 84th Ill. General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985) (Although searches
may be based on reasonable suspicion, no "contraband seized pursuant to a search with-
out probable cause shall be admissible in any adjudicatory hearing under the Juvenile
Court or criminal prosecution.").
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